feat: implement ADR-292/293/294/295/296 — provenance, UDP hardening, multi-node, model gates, CSI policy

ADR-292 (sensing-server): SourceState enum + pure transition (provenance.rs);
auth-error/unknown can never resolve to LiveVerified; synthetic exports
watermarked. Pose-fusion simulator starts SYNTHETIC and only shows LIVE on a
real decoded frame (#1557); sensing client no longer labels an unauthorized
status endpoint as live (#1526).
ADR-294 (sensing-server): NodeInference distinct from RoomInference (inference.rs);
deterministic freshness-weighted fuse_room; RateLimiter re-keyed to
(NodeId,EntityKind) so nodes do not starve each other (#1541); stale nodes go
unavailable not frozen-online (#1555).
ADR-293 (sensing-server): --udp-bind (default 127.0.0.1) + --udp-allow allowlist
+ fail-closed refusal of routable bind without allowlist unless --udp-insecure-lan
(udp_bind.rs); crate SECURITY.md documents the threat model and the deferred
per-device-auth step two.
ADR-295 (train): model_gates.rs — constant-output, unreachable-boundary (the
issue-1521 degenerate presence head), class-balance, baseline, and
metric-name-provenance gates.
ADR-296 (ci): scripts/csi-data-policy-check.sh (+ allowlist) and a workflow that
fails on tracked CSI-format/oversized-JSONL files; 6/6 self-tests pass.

Per-crate suites reported green by the swarm; CSI policy self-test 6/6 and JS
syntax verified here. Full workspace re-verification deferred until the
concurrent phase-1 spine build frees the target dir (disk pressure).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015TcKegTS7QqhWPC2L2SzaS

.github/workflows/csi-data-policy.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+name: CSI data policy (ADR-296)
+
+# ADR-296 repository CSI data-incident guard. Fails when CSI-format files
+# (*.csi.jsonl / *.csi.meta.json) or oversized JSONL captures are tracked in
+# git. Raw CSI is person data and must never be committed (CLAUDE.md, ADR-296).
+#
+# NOTE: the tree currently still contains the pre-existing incident recordings
+# under data/recordings/ and v2/data/recordings/, whose removal is gated on
+# data-owner sign-off (ADR-296). Until they are removed this job is EXPECTED to
+# fail, and that failure documents the incident. To make it green in a
+# follow-up without weakening the guard for NEW files, set CSI_POLICY_BASELINE
+# to a file listing the acknowledged paths (see the script header).
+#
+# Checker: scripts/csi-data-policy-check.sh   Run locally: bash the same script.
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - master
+  pull_request:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  csi-data-policy:
+    name: CSI data policy check
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Self-test the policy checker (deterministic, offline)
+        run: bash scripts/csi-data-policy-check.sh --self-test
+
+      - name: Enforce CSI data policy on tracked files
+        # CSI_POLICY_BASELINE can point at an acknowledged-paths file once the
+        # owner remediates the tree; unset here so a regression fails loudly.
+        run: bash scripts/csi-data-policy-check.sh --tracked
+
+      - name: Summarize result
+        if: always()
+        run: |
+          {
+            echo '### CSI data policy (ADR-296)'
+            echo ''
+            echo '```'
+            bash scripts/csi-data-policy-check.sh --tracked 2>&1 || true
+            echo '```'
+          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"