Assemble `wifi-veil/` as an extraction-ready standalone repository for the WiFi Veil privacy shield, decoupled from the RuView monorepo. The RuView copies under v2/, harness/, firmware/, and docs/ are left untouched; this is an additive, self-contained tree that can be split out to its own repo (e.g. ruvnet/wifi-veil). Optimized for a standalone identity, with all monorepo coupling removed: - Rust crate at the repo root: renamed `wifi-veil` (lib `wifi_veil`, bin `veil`), workspace-metadata inheritance inlined, own `[workspace]` root, release profile. Dependency-free and WASM-ready — it builds and tests OFFLINE, unlike the monorepo copy (which needs sibling submodules). Code is byte-identical, so the deterministic proof witness is unchanged. - Portable C shield core + per-provider firmware scaffolds (openwifi/openwrt/ nexmon/esp32) under firmware/; host C-core test passes. - npm harness renamed `wifi-veil-harness`; its guidance paths/commands repointed to the standalone layout; manifest SHA-256 digests regenerated and verified. - Docs: ADR-288/289/290 and the privacy-shield research bundle; research build commands/links normalized to the standalone crate. - Root scaffolding: product README, dual LICENSE-MIT / LICENSE-APACHE, .gitignore, CHANGELOG, CONTRIBUTING, and a GitHub Actions CI workflow (Rust test/clippy/fmt + wasm build, C-core host test, harness smoke). Validated locally: cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings, cargo test (43 tests + witness), cargo build --lib --target wasm32-unknown-unknown, make -C firmware/core test, and `node harness/bin/cli.js guidance` — all green. No telemetry, build artifacts, or lockfile committed. All defense figures remain SYNTHETIC / L0; compliant waveform controls only, never jamming. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WEXNqzs7UsfNFBcP5yW21p
WiFi Veil protector — openwifi (Xilinx Zynq + AD9361, open PHY/MAC)
STATUS: SYNTHETIC / L0 — build-only scaffold. No hardware, no flash, no capture. Nothing here has run on silicon. Per CLAUDE.md, none of this is a
MEASUREDresult and none may be claimed as working. Files are honest skeletons with real openwifi idioms plusTODO(hw)/TODO(hdl)markers, not validated firmware or complete HDL. Compliant waveform controls only — the keyed rotation is orthogonal (energy-preserving) and shapes only this node's own standards-conformant emission. Never jamming.
Feasibility grade: B (capability ceiling A; effort D)
openwifi is the only platform in this tree where a true end-to-end keyed
rotation and its inverse are physically reachable, because it is the only one
that exposes the full open PHY/MAC on FPGA: openofdm_tx/openofdm_rx,
tx_intf/rx_intf, and side_ch, all AXI-Lite-programmable from a Linux
driver (FPGA module design, openwifi overview). That is the A
capability ceiling.
It is graded B, not A, for two honest reasons that make it the highest-effort path:
- openwifi has no native explicit transmit beamforming. It ships as an
802.11a/g/n single-spatial-stream (SISO) design. It does not run NDP
sounding, does not compute an SVD
Vmatrix, and does not emit a compressed beamforming report. The two-antenna app note is RX-only coherent capture (side_ch_ctl wh3h11), not a MIMO transmit spatial mapper (iq_2ant). So there is no shipped compressed-BF-report to obfuscate and no shipped spatial-mapping matrixQto left-multiply — both must be added in HDL. - Reaching a true two-stream demo needs a second TX chain (the AD9361 on fmcomms2/3 has two DACs) plus a new spatial-mapping RTL stage and a Vivado rebuild — days-to-weeks of FPGA work, not a driver patch.
Because of (1), on openwifi WiFi Veil is realized as the client-transparent
per-packet keyed unitary (LeakyBeam family) applied at the TX spatial-mapping
stage, with the legitimate STA (a second openwifi node sharing the key)
inverting it — not as obfuscation of a compressed-BF report the hardware
never produces. This keeps the claim honest: we rotate the transmitted spatial
mapping so a sniffer's per-subcarrier channel estimate H·Q(key) is scrambled,
and the keyed receiver applies Q(key)^H before channel estimation.
Exact insertion points
The rotation is a keyed orthogonal (unitary) matrix Q(key, session) computed
by the portable core (../core/veil_shield.{h,c}), the same SplitMix64 schedule
used everywhere, so both ends derive the identical Q from the shared key.
TX (protector) — FPGA, new block veil_rot:
Insert on the baseband IQ AXI-Stream path between openofdm_tx (post-IFFT,
post-CP) and tx_intf (which feeds the AD9361 DAC). veil_rot left-multiplies
the per-subcarrier / per-stream sample vector by Q(key). Its coefficients (or a
key seed + on-FPGA schedule) are written over AXI-Lite from the driver shim
using the standard openwifi iowrite32(value, base_addr + reg) idiom
(tx_intf driver). See HDL_NOTES.md.
RX (legitimate STA) — FPGA, new block veil_unrot:
Insert between rx_intf (AD9361 ADC) and openofdm_rx, or in the frequency
domain immediately after the FFT and before channel estimation, applying
Q(key)^H. Same AXI-Lite programming path.
Driver / control plane: the C shim veil_openwifi.c computes the session
key schedule via the core and programs the blocks. Real openwifi control idioms:
AXI-Lite MMIO from the kernel driver, and the sdrctl nl80211-testmode tool /
side_ch_ctl register pokes for bring-up (sdrctl/side_ch, frequent
tricks). Where the exact offsets/bitfields are not yet fixed, the shim
marks TODO(hw); RTL specifics are TODO(hdl).
Doing the rotation in HDL (not the DMA'd payload) is deliberate: it keeps the
frame standards-conformant on the wire and preserves transmit energy — the
"not jamming" invariant the core guarantees by construction (orthogonal Q).
Two-node measurement plan (the P5 path)
Three roles produce the first MEASURED / P5 result (full protocol +
required witness log in MEASUREMENT.md):
- Protector AP — openwifi node A,
veil_rotengaged, TX spatial mapping keyed with the session key. - Legitimate STA — openwifi node B, shares the key,
veil_unrotengaged; should see near-baseline throughput (rotation cancels). - Attacker sniffer — a commodity Wi-Fi NIC running Wi-BFI / monitor capture, extracting the per-subcarrier CSI / beamforming feedback and running the re-ID model (Wi-BFI).
Headline metric: re-identification accuracy off vs. on at the attacker (target: collapse toward chance) while iperf throughput A↔B stays near baseline and per-frame energy is unchanged. No number here is real until a captured on-silicon log exists.
Bill of materials (target, not procured)
- 2× Xilinx Zynq-7000 board with AD9361 FMC (e.g. ZC706 + fmcomms2/3, or ADRV9361-Z7035 / Antenna-SDR), openwifi image per the openwifi build docs.
- 1× attacker host + Wi-BFI-capable NIC (per Wi-BFI's supported list).
- Vivado for the FPGA rebuild that adds
veil_rot/veil_unrot.
Files here
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
README.md |
this — feasibility, insertion points, measurement plan |
veil_openwifi.c |
driver-side C shim: core → session Q → AXI-Lite program (scaffold, TODO(hw)) |
HDL_NOTES.md |
the veil_rot / veil_unrot Verilog blocks (design notes, TODO(hdl)) |
MEASUREMENT.md |
exact P5 protocol, metrics, and the required witness artifact |
Sources
- FPGA module design — deepwiki.com/open-sdr/openwifi/2.2-fpga-module-design
- openwifi overview (sdrctl, side_ch, nl80211 testmode) — deepwiki.com/open-sdr/openwifi/1-openwifi-overview
- Two-antenna IQ (RX-only) app note — github.com/open-sdr/openwifi .../iq_2ant.md
- tx_intf driver register idioms (
iowrite32/ioread32) — github.com/open-sdr/openwifi .../tx_intf.c - Frequent tricks / register pokes — github.com/open-sdr/openwifi .../frequent_trick.md
- openwifi paper (SDR 802.11 on SoC) — researchgate .../342582824
- Wi-BFI (attacker BF-feedback extraction) — arxiv.org/pdf/2309.04408